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Russian Informal Institutions and Establishment of Efficient Safeguards for Personal Liberty and Private Property?

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Abstract

Local customs (informal institutions) allegedly incompatible with Rule of Law, personal liberties and private property is the strongest argument against new attempt to transplant these institutions in the Russia. Here we explore its validity in two ways. We try to compare Russian institutions with countries which succeeded to adopt some of above mentioned institutions: Germany, Japan, India, Spain. Then we observe data of public opinion surveys (regarding basic values, private property, freedoms and liberties). We also tried to interpret some demographic and criminal statistics dynamics as indications of the state of informal institution. Eventually we arrived to conclusions, that informal institutions and popular beliefs could damage the efficiency of adoption of basic safeguards for liberty and property, but these problems are quite comparable to problems of countries taken for comparison in their initial, pre-reform conditions. Civic society development in Russia shows growing maturity of the people and gradually growing demand for advanced institutions. The initial conditions for reforms are far from perfect but nor grave, not incompatible with future successes.

Keywords list (en): informal institutions, modernization, Russian modernization, limited government, economic freedoms, political freedom, traditional values

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Неформальные институты в России и укрепление институтов свободы и собственности

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Аннотация

Несовместимость глубоко укорененных неформальных институтов и институтов, ограничивающих власть и полномочия правительства, гарантий экономических и политических свобод, собственности является сильным и часто используемым аргументом против попыток их внедрения в России. Исторические сопоставления и анализ релевантных социологических, демографических данных подтверждает обоснованность опасений. В то же время показывает, что ситуация далеко не безнадежна и, в принципе, корректируема.

Ключевые слова: неформальные институты, модернизация, российская модернизация, ограничения власти, экономические свободы, политические свободы

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