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CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY SAFEGUARD
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CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY SAFEGUARD
Annotation
PII
S086904990000616-9-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Sergey Zhavoronkov  Konstantin Yanovskiy
Edition
Issue 3
Pages
34-46
Abstract
Could constitutional guaranties of property safeguards to boost and to sustain economic Growth in very Long Run? We are comparing classical case of the US Founding Fathers with a number of modern attempts (Hungary, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia) to manage economic problems of young Democracies by means of “constitutional regulation”. “Constitution” is defi ned here as a set of values and norms (not necessary fi xed), which have become deeply entrenched and accepted among the people so the changes in these norms are realized at maximum cost.
Keywords
Constitution, Constitutional Economics, property safeguards, “Instrument of Government”
Date of publication
05.05.2015
Number of purchasers
1
Views
3616
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
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