DICTATORS AND VAZIRS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE
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DICTATORS AND VAZIRS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE
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PII
S086904990000619-2-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Edition
Pages
36-51
Abstract
Общественные науки и современность, DICTATORS AND VAZIRS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE
Date of publication
01.03.2008
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3
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1072
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